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STRUCTURAL SHARED MONOPOLY UNDER
FTC 5: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
EXXON COMPLAINT
Previous judicial decisions interpreting the antitrust laws have developed
only mechanical and crude tests of market power. Unfortunately, these tests
have been rendered inadequate by the complexity of contemporary economic
institutions. The author suggests that the solution to this problem may lie in a
structural analysis of the economic power within a market. Such an analysis
would confront the realities of industrial concentration in the market system.
The author discusses the application of a structural analysis approach to the
Exxon complaint, an action filed by the Federal Trade Commission against the
eight major oil companies, and concludes that a structural analysis approach
should be accepted.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS against monopoliza-tion has generally depended upon the identification of reprehen-
sible conduct by firms with significant control over prices and competi-
tors.' This emphasis upon unlawful conduct has occurred because of
the particular ability of the courts to ascertain what behavior has taken
place and to evaluate whether that behavior has violated a specific
statutory provision. Most courts have construed the Sherman Act2 to
proscribe even beneficial and routine industry conduct when a firm has
exercised significant market power.3 However, the mere unexercised
ability to control prices and to exclude competitors has never been
sufficient to support a finding of monopolization.4
Because of the focus on conduct, judicial decisions have employed
mechanical and crude tests of market power which are easily applied
1. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04
(1946). The government alleged that three companies with 90 percent of the national
cigarette market had purchased a cheap grade of tobacco which they did not use in the
manufacture of their own cigarettes to deprive the manufacturers of cheaper cigarettes
of a necessary raw material, as well as to raise the price of that raw material.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
3. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affidper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
4. This is an economic definition of monopolization, but not a sufficient legal
premise for finding violative conduct. Even in the decision which comes closest to
proscribing an industry structure, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), the court recognized such policy defenses as "superior skill,
foresight and industry." Id. at 430.
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by a trial bar and a judiciary possessing little economic expertise.'
The essential portion of this analysis of market power has been the cal-
culation of a firm's market share. This calculation requires first a de-
termination of a product market and then an outlining of a relevant
geographic market. The market share of any given firm is the propor-
tion its sales constitute out of all the sales of all the firms in the relevant
product and geographic markets.6 This method of analysis identified
strongholds of inarket power in an era of simpler economic and indus-
trial institutions. The courts, however, have been dissatisfied with this
analysis and have gerrymandered geographic and product markets from
time to time in order to avoid a finding of monopoly. 7 This discontent
resulted from the realization that the judicial test of market power
did not correspond to actual market conditions.
The answer to this dissatisfaction with the market power test may
lie in modifying the customary approach and adopting a structural
analysis of the economic power within a market, or at least an analysis
from a structural perspective. This structural analysis would not be
constrained by arbitrary product and geographic definitions, but would
encompass all facets of the market, including structural agreements.
Such an analysis would not only provide a more accurate and compre-
hensive calibration of market power, but would also illustrate the inade-
quacy of the bare judicial requirement of significant reprehensible con-
duct. That is, as more complex economic and corporate institutions
are analyzed for the market power each contains, it will become clear
that market structure and the conduct of firms within that market are
not two distinct substantive elements,8 but, instead, coalesce as a struc-
5. This gap between antitrust enforcement and economic theory has long been
recognized. The classic discussion of the problem is found in Mason, Monopoly in
Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1937).
It is fully consistent with the legal conception of the monopoly problem
that the courts should inquire into the actual or probable results of agree-
ments to restrain competition. But to do so would be to give up the tradi-
tional tests of monopolizing and to grapple with the problem of what is an
unreasonable control of the market ....
On the other hand, if economics is to be put itself in the position to con-
tribute to the formulation of public policy, it must conceive the monopoly
problem in a more extensive way . . . . [Tihe formulation of public policy
requires a distinction between situations and practices which are in the
public interest and those which are not. And this requirement imposes the
necessity of elaborating tests which can be applied by administrative bodies
and courts.
Id. at 48-49.
6. E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(commonly referred to as the "Cellophane case").
7. See notes 59-67 infra and accompanying text.




tural agreement in which past conduct (structure) would support pres-
ent anticompetitive conduct.
Such a structural analysis is consistent with the spirit of the Sherman
Act,9 the application of the Clayton Act,' ° and the terms of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act," as these statutes have been
interpreted in a variety of opinions. Nevertheless, Exxon Corp., 2 a
complaint under FTC 5 against the eight major oil companies 3 for
reinforcing a noncompetitive market structure through various common
and accommodating activities, requires an extension of present law.
The success of the action depends upon a structural analysis of market
power, as well as a finding of "structural agreement,"' 4 which is essen-
tially evidence of past exclusionary conduct by permitting individual
firms and groups of firms to control prices and exclude genuine com-
petitors from the market. 5
This Note will examine the application of a structural analysis to
the Exxon defendants, eight vertically integrated shared monopolists.
The concept of structural analysis will be developed from its substan-
tial basis in existing case law and economic reasoning. Finally, the
acceptance of such an analytical technique will be urged for its value
in promoting more rational and effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws against monopolization.
II. THE COMPLAINT
The FTC has alleged' 6 that the defendant firms have engaged in
various common and accommodating activities. These practices per-
vade the industry from crude oil production, transportation, and re-
fining to marketing. The major integrated firms, majors, have evolved
a buyer-controlled pricing system for crude oil in which one of the ma-
jors offers a price for a specific density of crude oil in a field where it
9. Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970); see William Adams, Market Structure and Cor-
porate Power: The Horizontal Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUm. L.
REV. 1276, 1277-78 (1974).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FTC 5]; see Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972) (dictum); cf. Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
12. Docket No. 8934 (FTC, filed July 17, 1973), complaint reprinted in 3 TRADE
REG. REP. 20,388, at 20,269 (1973).
13. The defendants are the eight largest petroleum companies in the nation.
In order of size they are: Exxon Corp., Texaco Inc., Gulf Oil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp.,
Standard Oil Co. of California, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Shell Oil Corp., and At-
lantic Richfield Co.
14. See section V-B infra.
15. Id.
16. This Note assumes that the FTC's allegations are true.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
operates the gathering lines. 17  The other majors follow that firm's
lead by posting identical prices in other oil fields.' Although these
posted prices exceed those which would be attained in a competitive
market, the integrated firm until recently benefited from inflated crude
oil prices. 9 Since the majors each have substantial crude oil holdings,
the market price of crude oil determines the amount a major integrated
firm has "paid" itself, which, until recently, was identical to its deple-
tion allowance.20 Any "payment" between the refining division of an
integrated firm and its crude oil division may function as a transfer
of profits from the refining division to the crude oil division. However,
these artificially high prices for crude oil are both real and substantial
costs to the independent refiner. By "shifting profits" in this manner,
the majors keep prices and profits in oil refining artifically low. 2'
Low profits, of course, discourage new entry.
The defendant firms own or control, individually orjointly, many of
the pipelines which transport crude oil and refined products throughout
North America and the world.22 Access to these pipelines is essential
to all refiners because pipelines provide the least expensive and most
17. Federal Trade Commission Preliminary Staff Report on Its Investigation of
the Petroleum Industry, reprinted in ANTITRUST TRADE & REGULATION REPORT No.
622, July 17, 1973, at E-9 [hereinafter referred to as Staff Report]. For an example of
a schedule of posted prices, see Hearings on S. 1167 Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at
333-36 (1975).
18. Staff Report E-9.
19. Until the passage of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613A, which effectively pre-
vents use of the depletion allowance by the majors, inflated crude oil prices permitted
major integrated firms to shift profits from refining to crude oil production in order to
take advantage of higher depletion allowances.
20. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON
BROADENING THE TAX BASE, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 975 (1959) (paper submitted by
Prof. John A. Menge).
21. F. ALLVINE & J. PATTERSON, COMPETITION, LTD.: THE MARKETING OF
GASOLINE 217-25 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as COMPETITION, LTD.].
22. Staff Report E-8. For example, the Colonial Pipeline is owned as follows:











Joint Share of Defendant Firms = 44.2%
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efficient form of bulk land transport.2 3 By charging excessive (though
approved)24 rates for transporting crude oil, the integrated majors may
subject competing independents to a price squeeze. Potentially more
devastating in its impact is the majors' control of access to these pipe-
lines by a variety of complex scheduling and storage devices. 25  As a
result of this control, the independent refiner may have difficulty ac-
quiring the quantity of crude oil required in a given production peri-
od.26 Supply difficulties not only reduce the amount of refined product
produced, which usually reduces profits, but also increase the cost of
production by hindering efficient operation. Naturally, high pipeline
costs and periodic constrictions in supply to independent refiners
are passed through as short supply or increased costs to their major
21
customers, the independent marketers.
The major oil companies have developed a system for interfirm
exchange of crude oil and refined products29 which enables the eight
largest firms, and, to a lesser extent, the next 10 to 12 integrated
firms, to exchange crude oil and refined products. 30  Through these
Olympia Pipeline Co. is owned as follows:




Joint Share of Defendant Firms = 100%.
Data compiled from Walter Adams, Corporate Power and Economic Apologetics: A
Public Policy Perspective, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING
360, 373 (H. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann & J. F. Weston eds. 1974).
23. Staff Report E-7. About 75 percent of crude oil flows from the field by
pipeline to the refinery; pipelines carry about 27 percent of all refined petroleum trans-
ported in the United States. Moore, The Petroleum Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 123 (Walter Adams ed., 4th ed. 1971).
24. Pipelines are interstate carriers, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); thus, their rates are
subject to approval by the ICC. Id. § 6. It is, nevertheless, possible that these ap-
proved rates could be excessive. In at least one instance rates were approved by a
regulatory commission with the knowledge that "[n]o single producer's actual costs,
actual risks, actual returns are known." Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747, 829 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
25. Staff Report E-7.
26. Id. at E-8. Moore, The Petroleum Industry, supra note 23, at 125.
27. If production is reduced to a level below that of the minimal optimal scale
(MOS), efficiency suffers. See Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentra-
tion, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 21, at 26,
Table 3.
28. F. ALLVINE & J. PATTERSON, HIGHWAY ROBBERY 210 (1974) [hereinafter
referred to as HIGHWAY ROBBERY].
29. Staff Report E-4, Fig. I-1, Fig. 1-3; and E-9. For a detailed discussion of how
other types of product exchanges work, see Hearings on S. 1167, supra note 17, at
12-21.
30. T. DUCHESNEAU, COMPETITION IN THE U.S. ENERGY INDUSTRY 132 (1975).
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exchange agreements the major firms can function essentially as a
single operating unit with proportionately larger reserves. At the
same time, they provide crude oil to independents only under con-
tractual processing agreements. 31  These processing agreements
permit the transferring company to retain the ownership of both the
crude oil and the refined product. In effect, these transfer agree-
ments provide for a service charge for the use of the independent's
refining facilities. Such agreements permit the majors to exert
considerable control over the output and the refining capacity which
the independent refiners might otherwise economically attain.32
The eight major oil companies consistently refuse to provide an
adequate supply of refined products to independent marketers, 33 de-
spite the ready exchange among themselves and with the next 10 or
12 largest integrated firms. Additionally, the majors, in their own mar-
keting operations, consistently avoid price competition.34 Instead of
competing by price, they rely upon product differentiation realized
through heavy advertising, credit cards, full lines of tires, batteries
and accessories, and densely located stations.35
As the result of the above institutions and practices of the oil in-
dustry, the FTC alleges that "[t]he normal response of supply to de-
mand for refined petroleum products has been distorted. 36  In
addition, "[s]hortages of petroleum products have fallen with par-
ticular severity on sections of the country where independent refin-
ers and marketers are primarily located. 37  At the same time, the
majors have recorded record profits. 38 Despite these large earnings,
the major oil companies face no significant potential or new actual
competition because of the insurmountable barriers to entry which
arise from their common vertical integration and their accommo-
dating horizontal practices.39
III. THE ECONOMIC BASIS
To appreciate the application of the proposed structural analysis
31. Staff Report E-9. "There is little information on the frequency of this prac-
tice in the industry but it is known that, in some cases, refineries which appear to be
independents are under long-term contract to provide refinery service to major oil
companies." T. DUCHESNEAU, supra note 30, at 132.
32. See HIGHWAY ROBBERY 180-85.
33. COMPETITION, LTD. 237-38.
34. Id. at 212.
35. Id. ch. 2.
36. Exxon Corp., Docket No. 8934 (FTC, filed July 17, 1973), complaint re-
printed in 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,388, at 20,269 (1973).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 1974, at 12, col. 2.
39. See generally Walter Adams, Corporate Power and Economic Apologetics:
A Public Policy Perspective, supra note 22, at 360.
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to the Exxon defendants, it is useful to consider industrial organiza-
tion economics and the concept of the market. Industrial organiza-
tion economics is the branch of economics employed in antitrust analy-
sis. Traditional concepts of the market have not heretofore utilized
industrial organization economics to any great extent, but a structural
analysis would invite more of an economic definition in market delinea-
tions. This would, in turn, produce a more accurate and realistic
determination of product and geographic markets.
A. Industrial Organization Economics
In a perfectly competitive economy firms and consumers exert the
primary influence over the allocation of resources. 40 Through their
ability to change demand, consumers dominate in the perfect competi-
tion model.41 In a state of imperfect competition, however, the struc-
ture of a market may become sufficiently rigidified to allow a firm
to determine its individual demand curve, rather than merely to ascer-
tain the demand curve for the entire market.42 As a firm's knowledge
of structure becomes more specific and as the firm is willing to act
upon this knowledge, the balance of power tips in favor of the producers
rather than the consumers. If, for example, only a few companies
manufacture widgets and advanced technology presents substantial
barriers to new manufacturers seeking to enter the widget market,
the firms which produce widgets may reduce supply or increase prices
in order to maximize profits.
Unlike the broad-ranging analyses of macroeconomics, industrial
organization economics focuses on the performance of individual firms
and industries. The industrial organization economist utilizes three
basic concepts in describing a firm or an industry: structure, conduct,
and performance.
Industry structure is determined by a number of factors. Among
these factors are the number of leading firms, their relative size, and
the overall concentration of the market. Besides those relatively objec-
tive measurements, a number of subjective elements shape an indus-
try configuration: the extent to which sellers recognize their interde-
pendence, the ability of individual sellers to change market demand
by product differentiation, and the ease with which new firms may en-
ter the market.4
3
40. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 74 (2d ed. 1969).
41. In such an economy the individual firm has no control over price; it can sell
as much or as little output as it likes at one particular price, set by the market.
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 482 (9th ed. 1973).
42. Id. at 273.
43. R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 16
(3d ed. 1972).
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The behavior of firms is either consistent with existing market
structure or aimed at realigning the market. Gasoline marketing, for
example, has two types of retailers: the major-branded retailers and
the independent private-branded retailers. It would be consistent
with the structure of the retail gasoline market for independent private
dealers to price below the major-branded stations in order to retain
their share of the market. When the independents drop their prices
more than that amount required to equal the brand value of the ma-
jors, they may increase their share of the market." Such an action
would realign the market structure.
Except for exclusionary or coercive conduct, many economists have
generally discredited the use of price or quality practice alone as sound
indicators of performance. 45  Despite this guidance by economists,
however, the courts have generally relied upon conduct, per se, rather
than upon structure, to establish an adverse impact upon competition. 6
In a compromise but probably correct position, Carl Kaysen and Don-
ald Turner have stated that the rigid distinction between structure and
conduct is probably inappropriate:
[S]tructure in a broad sense can be taken to include both
structure proper and conduct. In this broad sense, the struc-
ture of a market, from the point of view of a particular firm,
44. COMPETITION, LTD. ch. 3.
45. See P. ASCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 120-24,
164-66 (1970).
46. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586 (1957);
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
Too often the law-as drawn up by Congress, enforced by the Depart-
ment of Justice, and adjudicated by the courts-regards various vigorous
forms of competition that tend to eliminate firms and reduce the discrepancy
between price and marginal cost as crimes rather than good deeds. The
legal mind is not so much concerned with the distortion of prices which it
has no means of measuring, as it is with methods by which prices are set.
Yet economic and legal minds do seem today to be converging.
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 41, at 528.
Professor Turner also discussed this test of conduct:
Conduct is a more familiar test of legality both to courts and those to whom
the law applies. Conduct is a test that ordinarily can be easily complied
with; it is easier for an individual to avoid bad conduct than to avoid a bad
situation or result, because the latter may depend in large part on the be-
havior of others and on external events.
• . . The forms of conduct we are concerned with are forms that cannot
readily be classed as either good or bad in themselves. . . . It is necessary
to examine the economic context in which the conduct takes place. . ..
And typically the restrictive effects will vary directly with the market power
of the firm involved. In short, in an attempt to determine the legality of
market power by assessing conduct, one tends to end up again with ques-
tions of power, and an attendant lack of clear standards.




comprises the circumstances external to that firm which
condition its decisions, including the characteristic conduct
of other firms in the market.
47
Performance measures the extent to which a market system sat-
isfies social, economic, and political wants and needs as well as the
extent to which market institutions mold and create future goals con-
sistent with basic social, economic, and political precepts. 48 In eco-
nomic terms a firm performs most efficiently when it achieves all
important economies of scale, produces the most goods at the lowest
practicable price, and makes "normal" rather than excessive prof-
its. 49 The concentration of market power in the hands of certain firms
must be viewed as a political force. For example, the extensive ad-
vertising campaigns launched in certain industries not only provide
a type of nonprice competition, but also create a demand for the
product. Thus, these market leaders effect a change in the allocation
of future resources and the eventual distribution of goods. This
self-perpetuation is inconsistent with the concept of creative destruc-
tion in the free enterprise system.50
The value of a market structure may not be measured by the size
and stability of its representative institutions, i.e., its firms, but by
the structure's ability to fulfill changing needs and desires:
The choice of institutions involves some view of human good
and of the design of institutions to realize it. This choice
must, therefore, be made on moral and political as well as
economic grounds. Considerations of efficiency are but one
basis of decision and often relatively minor at that.' Of
course, this decision may not be openly faced; it may be
made by default. We often acquiesce without thinking in
the moral and political conception implicit in the status
quo, or leave things to be settled by how contending social
and economic forces happen to work themselves out.51
To the extent that a given market structure encourages economic
efficiency and innovation, it might be undesirable to reform the struc-
ture, since such reforms could cause consumers to pay more for the
goods produced by the industry. Nevertheless, when this argument is
asserted as a defense to a deconcentration action, investigators
should examine whether the alleged economies are in production or
47. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 8, at 60.
48. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 392-94 (1967).
49. See, e.g., Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American
Manufacturing, 1936-1940, 65 Q.J. EcoN. 203 (1951). But see Brozen, Concentration
and Profit: Does Concentration Matter?, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 390-91 (1974).
50. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, chs. 7-8 (1942).
51. J.RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 259-60 (1971).
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merely in promotion.52 In a few cases, whatever the cost of lost ef-
ficiencies, the social cost of reducing the number of decisionmaking
centers may require deconcentration.53 Conversely, political consid-
erations as to the adverse effect of deconcentration of an industry on
the balance of payments 54 or on the construction of badly needed
refineries 55 might prevail against both economic and social costs.
Although anticompetitive effects are most readily discerned when
the prohibited results have been realized, such enforcement of the
laws against monopolization would be clear, predictable, and rela-
tively valueless. The policy against anticompetitive practices is so
clear that agreements to restrain trade violate the antitrust laws even
if those agreements do not and could not result in monopolization.
56
The courts have emphasized conduct in monopolization, and con-
duct plus intent are required by the terms of the statute in order to
support a finding of an attempt to monopolize. However, courts have
permitted such indicators of market structure as market concentra-
tion to magnify the reprehensibility of certain conduct so that it
achieves the level needed for a violation. 5 Nevertheless, the judici-
ary has been unwilling to examine structure as a sole criterion for
monopolization of a line of commerce. S
B. The Market
Antitrust case law has developed two types of markets which op-
erate together as a framework for the analysis of the economic im-
pact of the alleged anti-competitive activities. First, to determine
which firms compete with each other, a relevant geographic market is
outlined. In many cases that market is essentially an arbitrary de-
lineation of political divisions59 or a listing of several, possibly
52. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 16 (H. Goldschmid, H. M. Mann, & J. F. Weston
eds. 1974).
53. Blake, Legislative Proposals for Industrial Deconcentration, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 52, at 343-44.
54. One of the factors in the controversial ITT settlement was the effect on the
balance of payments.
55. Cf. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 48. The Treasury Department prepared a
report in response to the Exxon complaint, suggesting that the complaint would dis-
courage the construction of much-needed refineries, and urged the FTC to wittdraw
the complaint. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report on the FTC's Petroleum
Investigation, reprinted in ANTITRUST TRADE & REGULATION REPORT No. 629,
Sept. 11, 1973, at D-1.
56. Cf. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 169-70 (1948).
57. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), afJ'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
58. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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noncontiguous, areas where the firms being investigated do busi-
ness.60 As such, the geographic market is only a crude measure of
the economic impact of anticompetitive behavior, and may carry
more validity when the markets are defined by transportation costs
61
or other factors which would establish the area or areas recom-
mended as economically integrated. If, for example, it is demon-
strated that people living within a particular metropolitan area buy
most of their consumable goods in that area then that area might be
a valid geographic market for the retail sale of gasoline.
The other element in this portion of the economic analysis is
termed the relevant product market. The product market should
include all those products which are reasonably interchangeable or
which can reasonably be considered to compete. In practice, the
courts have stretched reason to its limits by including bottles and
cans in the container market, 62 all fuels in the energy market,63 and
cellophane in the flexible packaging material market,64 while isolat-
ing car and refrigerator enamel from other enamel.65 In each of these
instances, the determination of the product market has been pri-
marily result-oriented with little regard for its economic legiti-
66
macy.
Because these techniques for establishing the relevant market
are easily applied by the noneconomists who serve as trial counsel
and judges, the mechanical requirements are complied with in vir-
tually every antitrust complaint and hearing. Unfortunately, both the
geographic and product markets are readily subject to judicial
gerrymandering to evade precedent or statutory requirements, since
the relevant markets are findings of fact.
The Supreme Court expressed the purpose of the geographic market
in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,67 in which the Government
challenged the merger of Pabst with Blatz Brewing Company under
section 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court had dismissed the
action because the Government had not shown that either the State
60. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
61. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 557 (N.D.
II1. 1972), aff'd 415 U.S. 486, 491 (1974).
62. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
63. See United States v. General Dynamics, 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
64. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956) (the
Cellophane case).
65. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95
(1957) (the General Motors case).
66. An empirical basis for the determination of geographical markets has been
developed by Professors Elzinga and Hogarty. This analysis is discussed in T.
DUCHESNEAU, COMPETITITON IN THE U.S. ENERGY INDUSTRY 28-29 (1975).
67. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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of Wisconsin or the three-state area of Wisconsin, Illinois, and
Michigan was a relevant market. The majority of the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that all the Government needed to show was that
the merger had a "substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in
the United States . . ,69 The implication of this decision is that a
relevant geographic market is merely a device to delineate a work-
able area in which to collect data and to analyze conduct. If the
Government is able to show large market shares nationally or in
large politically-defined areas, courts may assume that there is a
substantial anticompetitive effect in some economically relevant and
substantial area.
Yet, even if the Government purports to define a specific geo-
graphically and economically relevant market as well as a relevant
product market, these definitions may not delineate the competitive
arena or the actual structure of the market. Such would be the case
if, for example, there has been little recognition of the complexity
and peculiar structure of the industry being investigated. Instead of
defining a market horizontally, e.g., gasoline refining or gasoline
marketing, some markets may be better delineated not only by hori-
zontal product lines but also by vertical production lines. Oil produc-
tion, refining, transportation, and marketing are clearly identifiable
horizontal markets,70 but the effect of operation in all of these
markets may synergistically exceed the mere accumulation of certain
shares of each horizontal market. The calibration of market power in
the oil industry might include the barriers to entry into this heavily
integrated industry as well as the oligopoly and oligopsony powers of
the firms. In addition, the economist might depart from his normal
static-snapshot approach to analyze the evolving and dynamic nature
of the industry. A dynamic analysis would evaluate the continued
stability of market power in the face of the classical presumption that
a free market constantly changes because of its exposure to storms of
creative destruction.
IV. MARKET POWER AND FTC 5
The concept of structure is also important in market power
analysis and the enforcement of the antitrust laws. An examination
of market power and the antitrust statutes is a necessary precursor
to a consideration of a structural analysis of the Exxon complaint.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
69. 384 U.S. at 549.
70. Moore, The Petroleum Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
120 (Walter Adams ed., 4th ed. 1971).
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A. The Structural Analysis of Market Power
A firm possesses market power when it can behave persist-
ently in a manner different from the behavior that a com-
petitive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise
similar cost and demand conditions.71
Traditionally, market power has been measured by defining a
horizontal market and then by determining the defendant's share of
sales within that market. This horizontal dominance test has been
used in both monopolization and merger cases.72 Where firms operate
simultaneously in several interrelated production and product
markets, however, as do all vertically integrated companies, a mea-
sure of their sales in one horizontal market may not be an accurate
test of their market power, either in that single horizontal product
market or in the market structure which includes both production
and product levels. A structural analysis of the market may dem-
onstrate that market power resides not only in the breadth of a mar-
ket, but also in its depth. Vertical ties and vertical integration are
conduits which transfer power from one horizontal market to another
for use at strategic times. These vertical relations thus assure the
long-term stability of the firm as it faces the external storms of
creative destruction. Beyond these advantages of leverage and
flexibility, however, integrated firms are also more capable of inter-
relating more frequently with other integrated firms than are
firms operating within a single horizontal product market.73 For
example, in the oil industry the eight major firms share crude oil
leases and pipeline ownership among themselves and with the next
dozen integrated firms. 74 Another pool of interest exists in the non-
profit exchanges of crude oil or refined products.75 When these
companies interact in similarly inefficient marketing systems, it is not
surprising that they should avoid price competition. The existence of
a scarce raw material76 magnifies the oligopoly and oligopsony
powers and, so, further benefits each of the defendants.
The petroleum market structure assures some common activities
71. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 8, at 75.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
73. William Adams, Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal
Dominance Hypotheses Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1282-86 (1974).
74. See note 22 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
76. The importance of scarce raw materials is an important consideration in
deciding whether or not to challenge a merger under the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Justice. U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 1 TRADE
REG. REP. 4510, at 6,886 (1968).
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and makes other accommodating activities possible without agree-
ment. For example, control over crude oil and refined products'
prices can be achieved without the use of traditional antitrust con-
duct violations as price-fixing. Nevertheless, a major firm's individ-
ual actions redound to the common interest of all the majors and
to the common detriment of independent producers, refiners, and
marketers. In addition, the structure of the petroleum industry cer-
tainly maintains a significant amount of residual power to be wielded
77against competitors in any horizontal product market. Even more
significant are the elements of perpetual existence, dominance, and
stability. When forces external to the industry, such as the institu-
tional advantage of the depletion allowance, are altered or elimi-
nated, these vertically integrated oligopolists can shift their re-
sources to regulate supply and cost to maintain their desired
dominance. 78 The ability of the majors to withstand such a severe
shock as the repeal of the depletion allowance merely suggests the
security of their fortress-like market structure.
The horizontal dominance test is a mechanical measure of a
static condition which may reveal concentration or monopolization
within a single horizontal product market. Although this test has
been the one traditionally applied by both economists and the
courts,79 the governing statutes do not require a mechanical test of
the concentration in a single horizontal market to reveal monopoly
or oligopoly power.80 The power of vertically integrated oligopolists
is difficult to assess by such a static test since the power they share is
dynamic. Often, the courts confront such a dynamic force in a single
horizontal market in proceedings brought for the attempt to monop-
olize, but the judiciary has in such instances relied upon the require-
ment of intent."' In such cases, the power of the would-be monop-
olizers has not usually been sufficient to control supply or price. 82 In the
oil industry the major oil companies may have achieved that control-
77. This power was demonstrated by the price squeeze on independent refiners in
the early 1960's. See COMPETITION, LTD. 156-78.
78. See, e.g., HIGHWAY ROBBERY 182-85.
79. William Adams, Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal
Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1277-79 (1974).
80. For a historical discussion suggesting application of the Sherman Act to the
oil industry, see E. RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 123-44
(1948).
81. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See also Turner, supra note
46, at 305.
82. Adams, supra note 79, at 1280-81. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.,
327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); United States v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 737, 738-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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or monopoly power-but the primary evidence of that power is the
conspiracy of structure in which the industry is ensconced.
B. The Statutory Basis
Three statutes provide the framework for antitrust enforcement:
the Sherman Act,8 3 the Clayton Act,84 and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. 85 As the oldest of these acts, the Sherman Act combines
common law words and phrases to vest in the federal courts a new
jurisdiction and to indicate the direction in which the federal judici-
ary should develop this grant of authority. The plain meaning of
the words in the statute does not indicate whether the Sherman Act
includes the concept of a "structural agreement. 86 Instead, the anal-
ysis must be directed at various prosecutions under the Act which
have suggested a clear judicial reticence in accepting this type of
structure as a presumptive violation.
Sherman Act prosecutions have been closely related to the hori-
zontal dominance test of market power and successful actions have
required a showing of very large horizontal market shares.8 7 It is
impossible to predict how such an easily applied test for market
power will be translated into a measure of market control that in-
cludes vertical ties between divisions of a firm, horizontal ties and
accommodations between competitors, and even possibly ties be-
tween facilities in different regions.88 It is highly probable that courts
will rely upon their horizontal dominance test and use these other
factors only to magnify the impact of that market share in the same
manner as courts currently treat such factors as a trend toward
concentration. Not only would such a test be less reflective of the
actual market control, but it would also prohibit the prosecution of
a complaint like the one in Exxon since there is a danger that the
structural conditions in the market would not sufficiently enhance the
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
84. Id. §§ 12-27.
85. Id. §§ 41-58.
86. The relevant language is Sherman §§ 1 & 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2:
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . ...
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States or foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
87. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(almost 75%); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (over 90%); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (75% to 95%).
88. See text accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
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approximate 50 percent combined market shares of the defendants. 9
Until structural agreement analysis has been more widely developed
in other types of antitrust prosecutions, it is unlikely to be accepted
under Sherman Act criminal prosecutions unless an exceptional case
is proffered for its adoption, since defendants must be proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. FTC 5 imposes no criminal penalties; the
Commission is required only to establish its case by a preponderance
of evidence. This lesser burden of proof and the absence of criminal
sanctions may be helpful to the Commission since the Exxon com-
plaint seeks the acceptance of novel violations and novel proofs.
In the same year as it adopted FTC 5, Congress completed its
antitrust statutory scheme with the passage of the Clayton Act.90 For
the purposes of this article, the importance of the Clayton Act is in its
application to mergers which would only remotely tend toward mo-
nopoly as measured by the horizontal dominance test.9' The par-
ticular zeal with which the courts have enforced the Clayton Act
reflects the frustration of both courts and plaintiffs in their efforts to
reach industrial concentration which does not itself constitute a
Sherman 2 violation.92 A structural analysis of market power under
FTC 5 would close this gap between Sherman 2 and Clayton 7 as
well as reduce the need and inclination for the more extreme Clayton
Act decisions.
In considering under the Clayton Act what mergers might "sub-
stantially lessen competition," the courts have taken notice of verti-
cal and conglomerate integration,93 particularly in three settings:
foreclosure, 94 reciprocity,95 and elimination of potential competi-
89. The eight defendants shared the following portions of the crude oil, refining,
and marketing horizontal markets:
Domestic Net Crude Production (1969) 50.54%
Domestic Crude Oil & Gasoline Refining Capacity (1970) 58.07%
Gasoline Market Share (1970) 55.01%
Staff Report E-4, E-6, E-7.
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970). Section 18 provides that:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). This
decision may have been correct in terms of structural monopoly.
92. See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policy,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
93. William Adams, Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal
Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1277-78 (1974).
94. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
95. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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tion.96 These Clayton Act cases provide the closest approach to a
structural market analysis. Logically, they should be extended to
support the adoption of this test in deconcentration actions under
FTC 5 or Sherman 2, except that the costs of such deconcentration
may far exceed the cost of merely enjoining a merger. 97
FTC 5 was passed by Congress in conjunction with the Clayton
Act in order to provide direction to courts which were threatening
to use the rule of reason98 to return to common law enforcement. At
the same time, Congress framed FTC 5 to provide flexibility in anti-
trust enforcement:
Issue was sharply joined on the question of whether the
new Trade Commission was to deal with "unfair methods
of competition" or whether the law should attempt to de-
fine those methods with some precision. The weight of
opinion was against an elaborate enumeration of such un-
fair practices. The Commission, under judicial supervision,
could work out the exact meaning of "unfair methods of
competition" as concrete cases arose. It is clear, how-
ever, that Congress expected the Commission to build up
its own administrative law of unfair trade practices and
not be limited rigidly to what had already been held to be
unfair trade practice at common law.99
Similarly, interpretation of FTC 5 by the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that it would be consistent with the policy and terms of FTC 5
to apply that section's prohibition to structures, relationships, or
conduct which have not previously been recognized as anticompeti-
tive.'G'
V. THE CONSPIRACY OF STRUCTURE
Traditionally, courts have initially considered the market power
of a firm charged with monopolization and have proceeded to con-
sider conduct aimed at competitors or customers only when the
horizontal dominance test indicates the existence of substantial
monopolistic power.'' Structural monopoly does not directly de-
pend upon either a certain horizontal market share or some specific
96. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
97. See Posner, Problems of a Policy of Deconcentration, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 393-400 (H. Goldschmid, H. M. Mann & J. F.
Weston eds. 1974).
98. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
99. Cushman, The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, in
STUDIES ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, No. III, at 5 (1937).
100. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
101. See note 87 supra.
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degree of vertical restraint, but it does require an analysis of market
power, including an analysis of common practices, common vertical
structures, patterns of behavior, and patterns of organization and
industry structure as they interact to create an intangible control of
the market. This can become fairly involved, since vertical re-
straints vary in kind and are not as easily or objectively measured as
are the sales in a horizontal market. Conceptually, the analysis of an
area of market power aids in understanding an industry such as the
petroleum industry because it reveals a solid bloc of power opposite
atomized independents strewn across each level of the industry.'0 2
The following analysis reverses the traditional order by approaching
monopolization first through a consideration of the power inherent
in the vertical structure of each of the defendant firms, and only then
examining their joint market power shared through a conspiracy of
structure.
A. The Structure of the Defendant Companies- The Vertical Analysis
Market power may reside not only in the breadth of a market but
also in its depth. In one of the earliest monopolization decisions,
United States v. Aluminum Company of America,0 3 the Second Cir-
cuit held that a 90 percent share of the domestic aluminum market
evidenced sufficient control over the market to violate Sherman 2.
Although the Alcoa opinion could easily be interpreted as holding
that the company's horizontal market share, by itself, was sufficient
to establish monopolization, later courts have been less willing to
make size alone an offense. This judicial hesitancy was manifested
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp."4 United Shoe
dominated the shoe machinery market, accounting for 75-95 per-
cent of market sales. However, the court's decision was based pri-
marily on United Shoe's past and continuing conduct rather than
on the company's market share. Judge Wyzanski concluded that a
substantial portion of United Shoe's market power was derived from
a restrictive system of leasing, rather than selling, its complicated
and unique shoe machines.'0 5 Although the court recognized that
these leases had been made for "honestly industrial" purposes, that
the leases were legal, and most importantly that the leases were
beneficial to shoe manufacturers, it ruled that such apparently justi-
fiable and even admirable conduct was exclusionary and proscrib-
able when carried on by the giant of the industry. The court's analysis
102. COMPETITION, LTD. 212.
103. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
104. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afid per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
105. Id. at 323-25.
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used the size of the horizontal market share to magnify the repre-
hensibility of the firm's business conduct.
United Shoe's leasing agreements fall within Kaysen and
Turner's broad definition of structure which includes exclusionary
conduct.' °6 These machinery leases included clauses providing for
both a substantial return charge and full-capacity use as well as the
integration of maintenance charges into the charges for the machine
during a ten-year term. These contractual bonds between United
Shoe and its customers were clearly assets of significant economic
power; that is, they stabilized, albeit temporarily, a vertical relation-
ship and made other dealings with these same customers all the
more likely. To the extent that these temporary vertical bonds im-
munize the supplier-purchaser relationship from normal, destructive
market forces, judicial injunction of these relations is no less struc-
tural relief than is divestiture, although it is clearly less drastic.
Just as a single dominant firm may develop a system of vertical
restraints within a structurally defined market, oligopolists or shared
monopolists may similarly rigidify the vertical structure of a
market. In 1970 the Federal Trade Commission proposed a com-
plaint against Goodyear and the four largest remaining bus tire
manufacturers. 10 7  The five companies which accounted for 99
percent of the market were charged with monopolization by main-
taining exclusionary leases with transit authorities and other bus tire
users. These leases were similar to those found to be objectionable
in United Shoe. They provided for a three- to five-year term with
service available only through these agreements, and a substantial
penalty attached for termination. The proposed Bus Tire Complaint
approached the conclusion that parallel business conduct was illegal
if it enabled a few companies to dominate an industry, but the action
was settled by a consent decree. Whether the ties are made pos-
sible only by horizontal domination of a market, by control of a
scarce raw material, or by some other device, this alteration of mar-
ket performance transforms the market structure.
This conscious alteration of market behavior was illustrated in
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,'1° in which the Supreme
Court dealt with a vertical retail price maintenance combination by
including the victims of the combination as parties to an agreement
106. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 60 (1965).
107. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 19,381, at 21,510 (FTC 1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Bus Tire
complaint].
108. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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violative of Sherman 1. In that case, Parke, Davis and its whole-
sale distributors maintained exclusive control over its patent medi-
cines and brand name drugs, which may be analyzed as a type of
scarce raw material. This exclusive control gave Parke, Davis, with
its distributors, a significant amount of power over independent
marketers. Parke, Davis exploited this power by threatening both
wholesalers and retailers with termination of supply if they failed to
charge certain minimum prices, and by threatening wholesalers with
termination of supply if they did not terminate the supply to these
retailers, once supplied with their names by Parke, Davis. In this
way, the company successfully utilized power from a legal monopoly
and its differentiated brand name drugs to influence their retail
price.
The majority of the Court was careful not to overrule expressly
the right of a particular dealer to comply with a supplier's unilateral
and unenforced (except by termination) restrictions in order to ob-
tain a unique or peculiarly desirable product. In other words, as in
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,0 9
the Court did not recognize that the structure of the industry precluded
the buyer's free choice or genuine bargaining power. However, the
Court did view Parke, Davis' program as a system of restriction,
i.e., a conduct violation, even if the systemic or structural violation
was not recognized.
This analysis of vertical relationships applies not only to temporary
vertical relations, but also to the permanent bonds of vertical integra-
tion. The Supreme Court twice reviewed decisions made by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission involving agreements, similar in effect to tying
arrangements, between certain individual oil companies and Goodyear
Rubber Company. In Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, "0 Atlantic agreed
to assist Goodyear "to the fullest practicable extent in perfecting sales,
credit and merchandising arrangements"'' with all of Atlantic's outlets
in return for a commission on sales made pursuant to these arrange-
ments. The Court explicitly recognized that the contract was not a ty-
ing arrangement, but that the effect was the same, i.e., that it was
"[t]he utilization of economic power in one market to curtail competi-
tion in another."" 2 The Court's decision also relied upon the coer-
cion of dealers by the oil company pursuant to the agreement. The
second FTC decision reviewed by the Supreme Court was Federal
109. 346 U.S. 537 (1954). See text accompanying notes 146-48 infra.
110. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
111. Id. at365.
112. Id. at 369.
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Trade Commission v. Texaco,'1 3 in which a similar arrangement,
which did not include coercive enforcement activities by the oil
company but merely a directory policy, was struck down. The clear
implication was that because of the structure of the oil industry
any type of exclusionary agreement would unfairly burden compe-
tition. In both Atlantic Refinery and Texaco the structure of the
industry magnified the reprehensibility of the exclusionary arrange-
ments and so was found to violate FTC 5.
Although vertical integration has had a significant impact in mak-
ing relatively obscure and progressively less reprehensible conduct a
violation of the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has specifically re-
fused to accept the Justice Department's argument that vertical inte-
gration itself violates the Sherman Act.' 4 As notable a commentator
as Robert Bork has argued that vertical integration is not properly
within the reach of antitrust enforcement, and that similarly vertical
agreement and arrangement, with only a few exceptions, should evade
prohibition." 15 The only expression of enforcement policy against verti-
cal integration is in the Justice Department Merger Guidelines under
Clayton 7.116 These guidelines and the enforcement of Clayton 7 of-
fer another perspective on vertical integration and market power, since
many more elements are considered in determining whether there is a
probability of lessening competition. The guidelines state that "the
Department's enforcement activity under Section 7 of the Clayton Act
. . : is intended to prevent changes in market structure that are likely
to lead over the course of time to significant anticompetitive conse-
quences."'" 7 Notably, the guidelines address themselves to barriers to
entry, resting on the potential ability of the combined firms to effect
a price or supply squeeze or resulting from economies of scale unre-
lated to production or distribution, e.g., promotional economies.
Other important considerations are the trend toward vertical integration
in the industry and control of a scarce raw material.
It is unclear whether any one of the defendants in the Exxon com-
plaint individually possesses enough power in both supplying markets
and purchasing markets to violate the guidelines, but the structure
113. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
114. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
115. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: PriceFinding and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 397 (1966). Although he argues for exclusion, Bork rec-
ognizes the relationship between vertical arrangements of all sorts and vertical integra-
tion.
116. It may be noted that the dearth of prosecutions under these vertical merger
guidelines suggests that many economists and attorneys within the Department of
Justice subscribe to the Bork view.
117. U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4510, at
6885 (1968).
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of the oil industry imparts control of scarce raw materials to the majors
sufficient to magnify the horizontal market shares to the level of guide-
line violation. This is because it is a multilevel industry with at least
two scarce commodities, crude oil and refined product, and a "scarce"
facility, oil pipelines.118 The Supreme Court has heard few vertical
merger cases, but the holding in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States'1 9
suggests a strict view towards vertical mergers. The acquisition by
Brown Shoe (a shoe manufacturer) of Kinney (a national retail chain),
whose market share accounted for 1 percent of men's shoes, 1.5 per-
cent of women's shoes and 2 percent of children's shoes was found to
be violative of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Besides examining the
concept of market shares, the Court recognized the strong trend toward
vertical integration in the shoe industry. 20 In considering vertical
mergers, the Court emphasized the importance of examining each merg-
er separately "in the context of its particular industry."'
2
'
This consideration in the context of the particular industries has at
least two distinct virtues: (1) the minimal optimal scale (MOS) for
industry facilities can be determined, and (2) economies of scale may
be considered as they actually apply to that industry. Economies of
scale are those reductions of cost per product unit which are associated
with maintaining a certain large volume in production, distribution, or
marketing. Economies of scale can further be refined by the concept of
MOS. MOS is shorthand for the point on the unit cost curve at which
the cost levels out and further size will bring no further savings in pro-
duction - the single most important economy of scale. For example,
if the MOS of production in an industry is ten percent of industry ca-
pacity, an oligopoly of ten firms would be economically justifiable
and desirable. At the same time, an MOS of ten percent would not,
in itself, justify an oligopoly of five firms.
In determining policy in regard to the structure of an industry, the
primary question is the extent to which economies of scale require
production facilities so large that only a few firms may efficiently co-
exist in the industry. In 1951 economist Joe Bain conducted a pioneer-
ing study which indicated that the average MOS plant capacity in inte-
grated petroleum refining (in coastal locations) was 1.75 percent of
national capacity. 22 Two recent studies have suggested that, in the
late 1960's, the MOS plant size for petroleum refineries rose to 1.9-2.0
118. Id.; see Staff Report E-1, E-7, E-8.
119. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
120. Id. at 332.
121. Id. at 321.
122. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 86 (1956).
[Vol. 26:615
STRUCTURAL SHARED MONOPOLY
percent of national capacity.123 At the time of these studies, the four-
firm concentration ratio was 33 percent, rather than the eight percent
needed to maximize production economies.
124
Other factors peculiar to certain industries may be important in de-
termining the relation of size to the economies of distribution. For
example, the MOS may change from one region to another. A prairie
refinery receiving its oil by transcontinental pipeline may exhaust ship-
ping and storage economies at a much lower volume than seaside
refining facilities. In a competitive marketplace, then, petroleum com-
panies would be expected to curtail refinery size at approximately MOS
for production and to locate their refineries at the points of most ef-
ficient distribution.
Frederick M. Scherer, chief economist for the FTC, has suggested
a type of distribution economy peculiar to the multiplant firm.
1 25
The economy envisioned by Scherer is not directly one of distribution,
but of managerial investment; it reflects the effect of the structure of
the industry upon decisionmaking. Such multiplant scale economy is
particularly important in processing industries such as petroleum re-
fining, where investment decisions may restrict the possibility of achiev-
ing scale economies for decades to come. Scherer's nonaggressive,
market-sharing hypothesis is that the higher the concentration in an
industry, the larger the plants will tend to be. Managers of the major
firms will make their investment partly in routine replacement and
partly in anticipation of increased demand. A dominant firm will
consider itself to have a claim on a certain fraction of the increase
in demand. It will, therefore, be in a better position than smaller fringe
firms to build the facilities necessary to satisfy this increase, since
the major firm will have control of both crude oil and oil pipelines.
Confronting such market control, it would be both difficult and fool-
hardy for a regional independent to invest $250 million in a new re-
finery. If the major firms have strong control over a certain percentage
of the market (e.g., 50 percent) the market might be too rigid to absorb
the entire production of such a facility. A major firm may coordi-
nate small increases in capacity in several contiguous regions to supply
slightly increased demand with little or no impact on the rigid market
structure.
Despite the increase in the cost of transportation, initial mathemati-
cal analysis indicates that such an investment strategy might save as
123. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 25-26 (H. Goldschmid, H. M. Mann, & J. F.
Weston eds. 1974).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 34-35.
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much as 20 percent of total discounted capital, operating costs, and
transportation. 116 This theory would provide a plausible, but not laud-
ible, response to the contention that concentrated industries may be
more adaptable to changes in scale economies. This multiplant, multi-
region economy of scale is a second-best economy achievable only
to the extent that the competitive market system has broken down.
"[T]he extent of market failure is susceptible to a considerable amount
of policy control. The more concentration is permitted to develop,
the more likely market failure will be, and hence the more importance
the second-best benefits of concentration will assume."
127
In 1974 the Supreme Court in United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co. 128 affirmed by memorandum decision the district court's analysis of
the structure of the California oil industry as it related to the doctrine
of potential competition. The district court noted that the California
gasoline market fit within the Kaysen and Turner definition of an
oligopoly and that high entry barriers precluded most companies from
standing on the edge of the market as potential entrants. Presum-
ably, Phillips' merger with Tidewater Oil was proscribed because of
the expected future conduct of both Phillips and the other companies in
the market, which now had one less potential competitor. The district
court noted that the Supreme Court had specifically reserved ruling
on whether a merger violated Clayton 7 if the firm had not been ob-
jectively perceived as a potential entrant or if the firm did not occupy
a substantial position in the market following the acquisition. The
lower courts found that Phillips had been a potential competitor, al-
though it is not clear from the opinion whether Phillips was "a
dominant force" in the market after acquisition. Perhaps the court in-
ferred such dominance from the oligopolistic market structure. If
Phillips was not considered to be such a major participant in the oli-
gopoly following its acquisition of Tidewater, then the enforcement
of Clayton 7 was triggered by present market structure plus expected
future conduct.
This speculative analysis depended heavily upon the court's assess-
ment of the industry on a national level; a national marketer would
achieve greater advantages in advertising, brand loyalty, and credit
cards, as well as added flexibility in exchanging crude oil and refined
products. While a nationally integrated firm would reap these bene-
126. INVESTMENTS FOR CAPACITY EXPANSION 229-35 (A. Manne ed. 1967); D. Erlen-
kotter, Capacity Planning for Large Multilocation Systems, Sept. 1972 (discussion paper
for U.C.L.A. Graduate School of Management), cited in Scherer, Economies of Scale
and Industrial Concentration, supra note 123, at 39 n.26.
127. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, supra note 123, at
40.
128. 418 U.S. 906 (1974), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 1226 (1973).
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fits because of both its own and the industry's structure, independent
marketers would be hampered by the entry of anew major firm through
acquisition rather than through internal expansion, since no additional
refining capacity would be created. Although the court did not refer
to the insularity of the major oil companies, the merger increased the
likelihood that a smaller percentage of the existing production of re-
fined gasoline would be available to independents because of inter-
major exchange agreements. 129 Judicial eagerness to employ doctrines
such as potential competition reflects dissatisfaction with existing,
concentrated market structures.
130
Although the Sherman Act has not traditionally been used to
deal with vertically integrated market structures, certain theories
used for enforcement, such as bottleneck monopoly and intra-enter-
prise conspiracy might be logically extended to encompass concentrated
markets within the Act's prohibitions against restraint of trade.
Bottleneck monopoly,'3' first of all, could be applied to an individual
company, joint venturers, or the eight defendants because of their
control and alleged abuse of oil pipelines. As the most economical
means of bulk land transport, access to these pipelines is crucial to
refining operations, and unimpeded use is essential to efficient opera-
tion. Pipeline shipment is a rather complex operation. It would be
relatively easy for the majors to impede the use of the pipelines by
any independent who either did not have storage facilities at the
trunk line station, or who shipped a relatively small amount of crude
oil. In addition, the rates may be kept artificially high through
bookkeeping adjustments for the integrated companies, although
such adjustments are real costs to independents. If the majors can
be shown to have foreclosed the use of individual pipelines, the
bottleneck monopoly doctrine could be effectively employed. The
difficulty with the doctrine is that it was developed by the courts to
deal with isolated, specific, and complete exclusions, not with
systematic and systemic frustration of independents.
An additional difficulty with the application of the bottleneck
theory is that the joint ownership and control of these pipelines, as
well as the rates charged, are approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission since the pipelines are classified as "common carriers."
This approval confers a partial antitrust exemption which is trouble-
some for two reasons: 1) the Commission is not primarily skilled in
recognizing and preventing anticompetitive activity and 2) decisions
of the Commission are made primarily in reliance upon information
129. See HIGHWAY ROBBERY 171; Staff Report E-4.
130. Cf., e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
131. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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provided by the companies themselves. In one regulatory case re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, the dissent noted that the rates in
question had been approved without knowledge of the cost involved
in any one specific instance.
3 2
The inability to make judgments as to anticompetitive effects,
particularly in areas peripherally related to the regulation has been
solved in certain cases by permitting the Justice Department to
bring suit. 33  In other cases the Department has been given statu-
tory authority134 to object to the grant of a license before the regu-
latory commission involved.135  Recent Supreme Court decisions
suggest that the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of regulatory
agencies may well be recognized, at least in cases where the regu-
lation is pervasive. 36  The statutory right of objection affords at
best a circuitous route to conduct which is largely unrelated or only
incidentally related to the regulated activity. The test for jurisdic-
tion in these cases could, more reasonably, be whether the regulated
activity is being challenged or whether that portion of the company
or industry is peripherally related to the violation alleged. Regula-
tion should be no defense to a plan of divestiture. In this instance,
an allegation of bottleneck monopoly would fall directly within ac-
tivity regulated by and best confined to the ICC.
A second theory in support of application of the Sherman Act
could be intra-enterprise conspiracy. The Supreme Court recog-
nized this doctrine by finding a conspiracy between a firm and its
incorporated subsidiaries. 37  Later, the Hawaii district court ex-
tended this doctrine to unincorporated subsidiaries, 38 and although
the Ninth Circuit reversed, 39 the reversal was expressly limited to
the facts of that case. In both cases, the subsidiaries were distrib-
132. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 829 (1968) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
133. E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
134. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (1970).
135. This is true in cases where electric utility companies apply to the Nuclear
Regulatory Agency for permission to construct nuclear-powered generation units. 10
C.F.R. § 2.102(d)(1) (1975).
136. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
137. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
138. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp.
915 (D. Hawaii 1967). See also Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using
Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 20 (1968).
139. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 7
(9th Cir. 1969).
140. We confine our decisions to the facts of this case. We agree that a "com-
bination or a conspiracy" to establish a common distributor could be shown to
have such an adverse purpose or effect on competition that it would violate sec-




utors, but neither court limited the doctrine to horizontal combina-
tions of corporate units having the same function. The doctrine of
intra-enterprise conspiracy is not a radical nor a theoretical doctrine;
it is a pragmatic approach to the organization of modem corpora-
tions.1 4 ' Briefly, each division is given substantial independence
and is charged with the responsibility of earning a profit for itself,
with little regard for the interests of other divisions. However,
the logical result of this structure is that the divisions have sufficient
independence to combine in restraint of trade to the same extent as
any independent companies. The clearest application of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine would be cases involving "shifting of
profits" vertically between divisions.1
42
Although this allegation would require more proof than just the
balance sheets of the divisions, it would seem that, if all of the
majors are shown to have "shifted profits" from their refining divi-
sions to their crude oil divisions, such actions would go beyond the
damage caused by common, independent business judgments or
conscious parallelism in an oligopolistic market structure. 43  In
some of the cases of conscious parallelism, a sound argument
admittedly could be made for the business decision to pursue certain
conduct. In this instance, however, shifting refining profits back-
wards, although against the interests of the refining division, clearly
has an adverse effect upon independent refiners.
Barring substantial extension of the Sherman Act through judi-
cial interpretation, these two theories provide the type of approach
available under the Act for dealing with the concentration of the
petroleum industry. Of these two schemes, the bottleneck con-
spiracy doctrine appears to be blocked by ICC regulatory authority.
The Clayton Act merger challenges are being forced into more ex-
treme and speculative theories to prevent further concentration.
Not only is there a substantial gap in enforcement between the
Sherman Act's horizontal monopoly and the reach of the Clayton
Act, but, in addition, those remedies achieved under either act
would be piecemeal at best. A structural analysis of the monopoly
power in concentrated industries would be consistent with the terms
141. In a different context, the chairman of ITT testified to this structure as a de-
fense to an antitrust action. The testimony gave rise to the "profit-center" defense.
Geneen, Concepts of a Conglomerate or a Multimarket Company: A Businessman's
View, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 4, 13 (1969).
142. COMPETITION, LTD. 217-19.
143. See text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
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of FTC 5 and would fill the analytical and practical gap between
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.'
44
B. The Structure of the Industry
The structure of an industry may affect the type or quality of
agreement necessary to violate Sherman 1. As the structure of the
industry becomes more concentrated, the agreement may be shown
progressively by express agreement, tacit assent, and finally con-
scious parallelism. Not only is the amount of proof of agreement
reduced with the concentration of market power, but the reprehen-
sibility of the conduct which must be shown is diminished. A
monopolist or a member of a very tight oligopoly may have to show
both that his acts were justified by independent business judgment
and that his conduct was of the least anticompetitive nature possible.
In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,145 the Supreme Court
initially considered the relationship between the parallel conduct of
oligopolists and the requirement of agreement. In that case the
cooperative actions of the distributors of 75 percent of the films in
commerce resulted in minimum admission prices and in certain
other uniform restrictions. The district court found an agreement
among the distributors, but the Supreme Court added in affirmance
that, in the circumstances of the case, such a finding of "agreement"
was not a prerequisite to "an unlawful conspiracy [which] may be
and often is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on
the part of conspirators."'146 It was reasonable to consider such a
formulation of agreement in Interstate Circuit, since the activities of
each individual firm would not have been beneficial unless similar
action had been taken on the part of each of the major firms.
Substantially identical business policies by the firms controlling
the distribution of 75 percent of first-class feature films suggests
that film exhibitors did not independently choose to accept these
minimum admission fees to acquire peculiarly desirable films.
Rather, the structure of the industry, along with this uniform con-
duct, precluded a sufficient supply of nonrestricted films.
The defendant oil companies in the Exxon complaint do not
possess such clear horizontal dominance 47 in addition to their
vertical bonds. The vertical interrelation in the petroleum industry,
however, is more significant in its scope and permanence. 48  A
144. See generally Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory
Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1213 (1969).
145. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
146. Id. at 227.
147. See note 89 supra.
148. HIGHWAY ROBBERY 216-18.
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structural analysis should employ Kaysen and Turner's dynamic
definition of structure as including conduct.1 49 Certainly the clearest
example of conscious parallelism, or at least of common "activity,"
is the common vertical integration of the major firms. Because of
the relatively low joint horizontal market share, courts might demand
more evidence of active rather than of passive cooperation as well
as a sufficient degree of reprehensibility.
Despite its novelty as a judicial doctrine, conscious parallelism
of structure should prove more compelling than mere present con-
duct, since the structure evidences past, present, and presumptively
future conduct. Without considering any possible collusion between
the companies, certain anticompetitive consequences suggest them-
selves. Each of these companies individually occupies a significant
portion of the horizontal market. It is not impossible that this
individual horizontal market share, magnified by the effect of exten-
sive vertical integration, could reflect monopoly power sufficient to
violate Sherman 2. When this individual structure is repeated eight
times, it necessarily isolates a large portion of the structural market
from the normal destructive forces of the market. In a structural
market, concentration applies both to the number of competitors
and to their share of the structural market which reflects the extent
of vertical integration.
This internal and parallel rigidity of the majors is made more
reprehensible by their supplier status with respect to independent
refiners. The majors uniformly refuse to supply independent re-
finers with any significant amount of crude oil, but they nevertheless
control the supply since they provide the next 10 to 12 largest
integrated firms with a substantial amount of crude oil. 150 By re-
ducing the supply to this second tier of firms, the majors deter-
mine the amount to be funneled through that tier to the inde-
pendents. This further parallel conduct might only affect
reprehensibility were it not for exchange agreements among the
majors themselves. These agreements permit no-cost exchanges of
either crude oil or refined products. If company A has a shortage in
Area 1, it may arrange for company B to supply its refinery in Area
1, while A supplies B's refinery in Area 2 where B has crude oil in
short supply. This coordination is undoubtedly valuable to the
major firms in that it allows them to utilize each other's reserves of
crude oil and refined product.
Despite the clear business justification for such agreements and
even possible secondary benefits and economies resulting from them,
149. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
150. Staff Report E-4.
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the agreements form a distinct link between the individual firms.
Furthermore, since none of these agreements are made with independ-
ents, they combine the majors in a single unit apart from the re-
mainder of the industry. The only arrangements which are entered
into between majors and independents are contractual processing
agreements whereby a major firm retains ownership of both the
crude oil and refined product - in effect merely paying a service fee
for the use of an independent's refining facilities. With proof of
this type of horizontal link between the majors, their joint horizontal
market power could be magnified by vertical bonds in order to
demonstrate the scope and tightness of the combination.
These exchange agreements and other horizontal links, such as
joint ventures in both oil leases151 and pipelines, 5 2 result in the
majors being drawn together into a single unit virtually indivisible for
the purpose of evaluating the division of power within the industry.
Whether this combination is one of tacit agreement or of a conspir-
acy of structure, the major firms have common and collective
interests in their relationships with independent producers, refiners,
marketers, and the consuming public, as well as in their mutual
perpetuation. The common vertical integration across so many
horizontal markets by firms with half the sales in each horizontal
market would itself rigidify the structural market in order to confer
a limited immunity from normal destructive market forces. Since
the power within this structure is not entirely static, but also dynamic
(i.e., through conduct), the combination and its market power is self-
perpetuating. Because the perpetuation of common interests makes
possible the retention of monopoly,' 53 the structure alone in such an
industry could be found violative of the antitrust laws.'










Walter Adams, Corporate Power and Economic Apologetics: A Public Policy Perspec-
tive, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 360, 372 (H. Goldschmid,
H. M. Mann, & J. F. Weston eds. 1974).
152. See note 22 supra.
153. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 792 (1946):
A friendly relationship within such a long established industry is, in itself, not
only natural but commendable and beneficial, as long as it does not breed illegal
activities. Such a community of interest in any industry, however, provides
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This stability or power of self-perpetuation can be identified in
the present, rapidly changing petroleum industry. Because institu-
tional advantages such as the depletion allowances have been re-
moved, crude oil production is no longer so highly profitable as it
was.154 As a result, the inefficient, low-volume service stations, which
had been subsidized by production profits, are being replaced by
fewer, high-volume outlets; i.e., the majors are more actively pur-
suing their marketing operations.1 55 Not only can they avail them-
selves of such competitive tools as advertising and credit cards, but
they also have extensive control over two scarce raw materials
(crude oil and refined product) as well as a scarce facility (oil pipe-
lines).1 56 The majors need not generate an energy crisis to benefit
from the periodic scarcity of supply which can be aimed at competing
independent marketers. It is not unreasonable to expect the majors
to subject independent marketers to a product or price squeeze
similar to that previously experienced by independent refiners.1 57
In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 5 8 the Supreme Court appeared to reject conscious parallel-
ism as being, in itself, a violation of the Sherman Act. The common
conduct alleged was the refusal of distributors with 63 percent of the
first-run film market to supply a suburban theatre with first-run
films. The Court ascertained that the distributors had exercised bona
fide business judgment in pursuing the most profitable mode of dis-
tribution. This finding may have been influenced by the Court's
greater sympathy for the supplier's unilateral right to choose its
customers than for systems of price restriction. However, the Court
did fail to recognize that justifiable business conduct might still be
exclusionary. Beyond this objection, the implicit conclusion that a
system of distribution is efficient is unsupportable without a consid-
eration of the entire structure of the industry. A noncompetitive
market structure may generate certain secondary benefits in adver-
tising or management, but the structure may prevent price competi-
tion and the realization of MOS with respect to both production
and distribution.
In Theatre Enterprises, the producer-distributors supplied only 63
percent of the first-run movies shown in Baltimore. The Court may
a natural foundation for working policies and understandings favorable to the
insiders and unfavorable to outsiders.
154. HIGHWAY ROBBERY 59-61.
155. In 1967 crude oil production accounted for 63 percent of the profits of major
integrated firms as opposed to a mere 21 percent for refining and marketing combined.
T. DUCHESNEAU, COMPETITION IN THE U.S. ENERGY INDUSTRY 35 (1975).
156. COMPETITION, LTD. 216-17.
157. Id. at 170-71.
158. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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simply have concluded that this collective market share was too small
to violate the Sherman Act under the horizontal dominance test. In its
analysis the Court did not consider the status of the defendants as both
producers and distributors; nor did it calculate the effect of the contrac-
tual licensing agreements with exhibitors which extended the defend-
ants' power into yet a third horizontal market. The effect of these
vertical relationships and the parallel refusal to supply first-run films
was to exclude suburban theatres from that portion of the movie mar-
ket. Simultaneously, of course, the defendants' licensee exhibitors
were insulated from this potential competition by higher barriers to
entry into the first-run market.
It is clear that the Supreme Court employed an inadequate meth-
od of analysis in Theatre Enterprises. By the passage of the Sherman
Act, "[Congress] did not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones;
it forbad all."' 5 9 The economic efficiencies which the Court implicitly
considered a part of good business judgment were not defenses to
monopolization. Even if the Court believed it necessary to consider
certain economies, however, the judiciary must use a structural analy-
sis to discern whether the economies are primary ones which reduce
the cost of production or distribution, or secondary economies, such as
those of management and advertising, which are realized only to the
extent to which the competitive market has broken down. Without
such an analysis, the Court would be unable to determine whether a
more competitive and deconcentrated industry would attain comparable
and preferable efficiencies.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals did not permit Theatre Enter-
prises to prevent a finding of conscious parallelism or structural agree-
ment in Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.160  In that case distributors of 85
percent of all first-class films combined to create a standardized envi-
ronment from which one type of distributor was systematically ex-
cluded. 16' The court of appeals presumed that a competitive system
of film distribution would encourage innovation in exhibition facili-
ties.' 62 The decision noted that the distributors had developed a gen-
eral and, by implication, a national policy towards first-class drive-ins.
The national scope of this policy appeared to influence the court's de-
cision; a generalized practice among 85 percent of the national film
159. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
160. 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952). Contra,
Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Calif. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953), ajf'd, 215 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 912 (1955).
161. This standardized environment might be analogized to the standardized environ-
ment in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
162. In Theatre Enterprises, the facilities in question were first-class drive-ins.
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distributors would create a more exclusive structure than if the firms
had implemented this policy in a single region. Under this reasoning,
the major integrated oil companies become more susceptible to a find-
ing of conscious parallelism as they participate in interregional ex-
change agreements, engage in interregional and internationaljoint ven-
tures in oil leases and pipelines, and establish a uniform domestic
system for the pricing of crude oil.
Conscious parallelism is clearly in disfavor as the basis of an inde-
pendent violation of the Sherman Act or as proof of such a violation.
Due to the paucity of cases brought on this theory subsequent to the
Theatre Enterprises decision, it has not been established whether a more
extensive showing of common activity, and perhaps proof that the paral-
lel activity was not supported by independent and bona fide business
judgment, would violate the Sherman Act proscription of agreements
in restraint of trade. If extensive common conduct can be combined
with horizontal links between the dominant companies in an industry,
it seems likely that the resultant standardization and rigidity of environ-
ment within the industry would restrain trade. This is particularly true
if the suggested structural method of market analysis is employed,
because parallel structure and parallel conduct can be shown in the
depth as well as the breadth of the market.
Although logically appropriate, conscious parallelism is, in itself,
only arguably a Sherman 1 violation or even proof of such a violation.
This significant uncertainty, however, does not extend to conscious
parallelism as an unfair method of competition under FTC 5. In
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute,163 the Commission
alleged that the Cement Institute, a trade association, its 74 corporate
members, and 21 individuals associated with the Institute had main-
tained a multiple-based point system for pricing. The result was that
virtually all cement buyers in any locality had been unable to purchase
cement for delivery from any one producer at a cost lower than that
of any other producer. Although the Court did not indicate the con-
centration of the industry by the use of conventional market shares,
it noted that since 80 cement producers operated 150 plants, "[t]his
concentration of productive capacity made concerted action far less dif-
ficult than it would otherwise have been."' 64 From evidence that the
Institute worked in cooperation with its members to maintain the base-
pricing system, the Court affirmed the Commission's finding that there
was an understanding between the parties.
The opinion, however, also indicated that such a conclusion could
163. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
164. Id. at 713.
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be justified because the pricing system produced "uniform prices and
terms of sale throughout the country." 165 This statement supports the
standardized environment theory suggested in the discussion of Mil-
gram; i.e., a uniform pattern of behavior plus sufficient market con-
centration or other evidence of market power would violate FTC 5.
The cooperative pricing system in Cement Institute is analogous to
the posted pricing system in crude oil fields, with the notable distinc-
tion that the multiple-based point pricing system reflects oligopoly
pricing power, while the posted pricing system reflects oligopsony
power. The courts have not yet applied the antitrust laws to oligop-
sony power. In fact, they have only rarely acknowledged its exist-
ence. 166 Nevertheless, on the assumption that the Commission and
the reviewing courts will recognize the similar ultimate effects of
oligopoly and oligopsony pricing systems, the posted pricing system
would fall squarely within the holding of Cement Institute.
A second critical distinction between Cement Institute and the Ex-
xon complaint is that the latter conceives of this pricing system and
other parallel conduct as symptomatic of a structural concentration
and stagnation of power. Unlike Cement Institute, Interstate Circuit,
or United Shoe, the Commission does not seek the injunction of a prac-
tice with serious structural implications. The Exxon complaint de-
mands the more drastic structural remedy of divestiture. The other
conduct by the Exxon defendants is not so blatant as the almost
identical prices in Cement Institute.
Activities of the petroleum companies, however, are generally much
more pronounced than those in Kellogg Co.,167 another pending FTC
complaint. The Cereal complaint approaches the charge that parallel
vertical integration is illegal per se when accompanied by the market
power inherent in a tight oligopoly. The complaint alleges that in 1970,
after a steady increase in market concentration, the four dominant
ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal manufacturers jointly controlled 90 percent
of the market. These firms were charged with the following violation
of FTC 5:
For at least the past 30 years, ... respondents . .. have
engaged in acts or have practiced forbearance with re-
spect to the acts of the other respondents, the effect of
which has been to maintain a highly concentrated, non-
165. Id. at 716.
166. Oligopsony power was alluded to in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747, 792-95 (1968).
167. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,898, at 21,915 (FTC
1972) [hereinafter referred to as the Cereal complaint].
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competitive market structure in the production and sale of
RTE cereal.
68
Following the issuance of the complaint, an FTC spokesman at-
tempted to assuage the fears of concentrated industries by character-
izing the complaint as an action against certain marketing practices-
peculiarly the use of heavy advertising to differentiate trademarked
products. Essentially, the complaint states not only that economies
of scale in advertising are an insufficient justification for permitting the
concentration of monopoly power, but also that advertising is actual-
ly an unfair trade practice if it promotes or permits the retention of
monopoly or oligopoly power.
The Cereal complaint resembles the Bus Tire complaint in that the
defendants are members of a very tight oligopoly. The notable dis-
tinction between the two complaints is that the alleged abusive con-
duct in the Cereal complaint has only scant support in case law. This
support is based on the theory that there is a point at which product
differentiation no longer serves the general welfare by conveying in-
formation, but instead becomes a wasteful technology which merely
entrenches market leaders. 69  Traditionally, heavy market concen-
tration would magnify even conduct beneficial to the industry into a
violation.
The Cereal complaint is a departure from conduct-focused enforce-
ment, but the traditional horizontal dominance test reveals a very tight
oligopoly. For that reason, the case will be tried routinely, only the
requested relief will focus on structure. Indeed, one FTC Commis-
sioner has suggested that recent merger cases reflect "the growing
judicial receptivity to showings that conduct-based relief is sometimes
not enough to terminate a violation. I see no a priori reason why
that may not be equally true of [Sherman] Section 1 or [FTC] Section
5 cases."
170
The Exxon complaint goes far beyond its predecessors. The mar-
ket concentration is much lower if a traditional horizontal measure is
applied - eight firms share 58.07 percent of domestic crude oil re-
fining capacity, 58.78 percent of domestic gasoline refining capacity,
50.54 percent of domestic crude oil production, and 55.01 percent of
retail gasoline marketing. 17 ' A new analysis of market power is
therefore necessary unless the courts are to be urged to depart
radically from present law. A structural analysis of oligopoly power
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
170. Oligopoly Pricing, CCH TRADE REGULATION REPORTS No. 166, March 3, 1975,
at 6 (Statement by FTC Commissioner Nye).
171. Staff Report E-4, E-6.
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and vertical integration would fill this void. 7 2 Economist William
Adams has suggested how such an analysis might have been properly
applied in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 173 In that case
the Government charged that a joint venture formed to produce and
sell sodium chlorate was a violation of both Sherman 1 and Clayton
7. Two chemical companies who competed in many other markets
had formed a joint venture and centered the sodium chlorate market
in the southeastern United States. Before the formation of the joint
venture, the market had been dominated by two firms which had
shared 90 percent of the market.
Both the district court and the Supreme Court became entangled
in the problem of subjective proof of the reasonable probability of
independent entry. An objective approach to measuring the prob-
able injury to competition is clearly preferable to a subjective inquiry
into future intent. At the trial level the Government alleged that
the joint venture would reduce the competition between Pennsalt
and Olin in the many other markets in which they did business. The
lower court rejected this argument, finding that calcium hypochlorite
was not within the relevant product market-chlorates. Although
the Government did not appeal this determination, such an objective
structural test would certainly provide a better indication of the
probable injury to competition than does a subjective measure of the
effect and intent of potential competitors.
7 4
If firms compete in a variety of markets which are dominated by
a few firms of similar size, they are likely to be aware of these
"direct rivals."'" When such direct rivals engage in a joint venture,
they act under an explicit contractual agreement. Without decid-
ing the proper application of this test to conglomerates, the joining
of direct rivals in a single substantial joint venture, or in multiple
joint ventures, should create a presumption that these direct rivals
would not perform as active competitors in other levels of that
market. If these rivals follow cooperative or mutually beneficial
policies in other areas of the market, they should be presumed at
least to be consciously parallel, if not tacitly accepted.
The defendants in the Exxon complaint operate numerous joint
ventures overseas, joint ventures in oil pipelines, and joint bidding
for offshore oil leases. Although only oil pipelines are specifically
cited in the complaint, it is noteworthy that members of an oligop-
172. William Adams, Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal Domi-
nance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM L. REV. 1276 (1974).
173. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
174. William Adams, supra note 172, at 1296.
175. Cf. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 316-17 (2d ed. 1969).
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olistic market who exhibit extensive common behavior and whose
corporate structures bear such a close resemblance should choose to
enter a partnership in which they are protected by a statutory exemp-
tion. Furthermore, when these partnerships occur at strategic points
in a vertically integrated market, it is difficult to believe that those
firms will engage in any activity which could harm their mutual
interests at another level.
This joint control of scarce crude oil or refined products, as well
as pipelines, may be construed as collective power assets which not
only perpetuate but expand the majors' collective power. The
clearest example of the effectiveness of such power assets is mani-
fested in the advertising practices of the firms named in the Cereal
complaint. Advertising may advance the interests of all the oligop-
olists who sell nationally-branded cereal by increasing the overall
demand for brand-name RTE cereal as well as by raising barriers
to entry to impossible heights. Selective restriction or exclusion
from access to pipelines similarly inhibits independent refiners and
discourages new entry, since entry on an integrated scale would be
too costly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Exxon complaint provides the courts with a factual situation
ideally suited to the adoption and use of a structural market analysis.
The judiciary will perhaps be hesitant to adopt a test which focuses
on structure if it fails to recognize structure as a dynamic process
which, like pure conduct, may be the basis of monopoly power even
though proven lawful and beneficial in its own terms. Logically, a
structural monopoly does not differ from a horizontal monopoly. The
structural analysis, however, can be applied with less concern about
unfairness under FTC 5, since a Sherman violation may entail both
criminal liability and the threat of private treble damage actions. A
second problem of inequity may arise upon the granting of remedies,
because one oligopolist may have a significantly larger portion of
the market than another.'7 6 In the Bus Tire complaint, oligopolists
had market shares ranging from 33 percent to 7 percent, 1 7 but the
vertical restraint was identical in each case-restrictive leasing agree-
ments. To the extent that the structure has come about by uniform
practices, e.g., advertising, there may be little unfairness in pro
rata reducing this supergrowth or superstability capacity to desired
176. T. DUCHESNEAU, supra note 155, at 50-58.
177. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
19,381, at 21,510 (FTC 1970).
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levels. The individual firm size, however, should be discounted for
nonproportional growth based upon acquisitions. The relief re-
quested in the Exxon complaint is sufficiently flexible to permit ad-
justments for disproportionate stability or growth displayed by any
of the companies. The FTC's requested relief focuses on divestiture
of 40 to 60 percent of the defendants' collective refining capacity and
the creation of 10 to 13 firms to assume this function. 17  Since the
majors would then have more crude oil than they could refine and
less refined product than required by their marketing division, the
temptation to engage in either price or product squeezes would pre-
sumably be mitigated. Clearly, the Commission hopes to remove
many of the middle links in the production chain.
The relief, however, does not disregard the remainder of the
market structure. Besides a prohibition against future refinery ac-
quisitions, the Commission seeks the limitation of joint ventures,
processing arrangements, and crude and product exchanges. The
goal of this request is clearly to disrupt the community of interest and
"power assets" of these direct rivals, as well as to reduce physically
their share of the refining market. Such a request is the essence of
structural relief: the deconcentration of market power by physical
divestiture, as well as the destabilization of the facility to eliminate
control of the market.
The recognition of a structural monopoly or structural oligopoly
violation under FTC 5 will enable private and government enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws against concentrated industries. Courts
have occasionally suggested their aversion to handholding among the
largest corporations in America, 79 but have used this innate distrust
to stretch existing doctrines and to adopt subjective theories of future
conduct. Structural monopoly under FTC 5 would fill the gap in
enforcement powers between the present Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, thus promoting a more objective and rational antitrust
enforcement policy. Finally, the acceptance of structural monopoly,
along with the appropriate divestiture and injunctive relief, may en-
courage risk-conscious management in concentrated industries to
spin-off divisions voluntarily' 80 and to pursue truly independent
business planning.
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